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China’s Rapidly Evolving Health Care System

MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION
A 55-year-old man with no serious health conditions has a moderately severe myocardial infarction.
Management of myocardial infarction in China varies considerably between rural and urban areas, and Mr. Li lives in a rural
area, where he’s covered by rural health insurance. He develops
chest pain around midday. An hour later, he calls the village doctor, who arrives at his home about 30 minutes later and administers nitroglycerin tablets. When the pain is not alleviated, the
doctor calls a senior internist at the county hospital, who advises
the patient to call an ambulance to transport him to the hospital,
which is 30 minutes away. As is customary in China, however, Mr.
Li waits for his daughter to come home from work so she can
accompany him. He arrives at the hospital around 7 p.m.
There, electrocardiography and myocardial-enzyme tests confirm that he’s having a myocardial infarction. He has two treatment
options: intravenous thrombolysis at the county hospital or cardiac
catheterization at a tertiary care hospital. His doctor recommends
the latter, since it’s too late for thrombolysis to be effective.
Mr. Li hesitates because of the added expense of care at the
tertiary facility: treatment at the county hospital requires a $300to-$600 copayment, as compared with $2,000 to $2,500 at the
tertiary facility. His family’s annual income is only $6,000. Nevertheless, he opts for the tertiary hospital.
Mr. Li undergoes angiography and receives two stents. He
stays in the hospital for 2 weeks, spending half that time in the
cardiac intensive care unit. He is discharged on aspirin, clopidogrel, an angiotensin-converting–enzyme inhibitor, a beta-blocker,
spironolactone, and a statin. His insurance pays 60% of the cost
of these medicines up to a maximum of $800, leaving him with
out-of-pocket medication expenses of $700 to $800 per year.
Mr. Li receives very little counseling about preventive measures such as smoking cessation or hypertension or lipid management. He returns to his village with no arrangements for primary care follow-up.

easier to reform health insurance
than delivery systems and that in
creating effective delivery systems,
primary care seems to play a vital role.
A review of China’s health care
journey reveals that its leadership
has made significant errors but
has also acted with flexibility
and decisiveness in correcting its
mistakes. China’s willingness to
undertake major health care experiments will make its system
an interesting one to continue to
observe in the future.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From the Commonwealth Fund, New York
(D.B.); and the Department of Health Policy
and Management, Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health, Boston (W.H.).
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or more than two decades,
states have been adding to
the things that physicians must
say and do to obtain “informed
consent” — and thereby testing
the constitutional limits of states’

power to regulate medical practice. In 1992, the Supreme Court
upheld states’ authority to require
physicians to provide truthful
information that might encourage a woman to reconsider her
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decision to have an abortion,
finding that such a requirement
did not place an “undue burden”
on the woman.1
Now, there is a potential vehicle for a new Supreme Court ex-
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amination of informed consent:
a recent decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit that conflicts with other
appellate court decisions. The
Fourth Circuit struck down a
North Carolina statute, called the
Display of Real-Time View Requirement, that required physicians to “perform an obstetric
real-time view of the unborn
child” that the patient could see;
to simultaneously explain the display, including “the presence, location, and dimensions of the
unborn child within the uterus
and the number of unborn children depicted,” as well as “the
presence of external members
and internal organs, if present
and viewable”; and to offer the
patient “the opportunity to hear
the fetal heart tone.” The woman
undergoing ultrasonography, presumably partially unclothed, was
permitted to avert her eyes and
cover her ears, but the physician
was required to speak. Penalties
for noncompliance included liability for damages and disciplinary measures, including license
revocation, by the North Carolina Medical Board. The appeals
court concluded that the statute
violated the First Amendment’s
prohibition on state-compelled
speech.2
The First Amendment protects
both the freedom to speak and
the freedom not to speak. However, there are limits to both
freedoms. As long as the law is
viewpoint-neutral, the state can
limit the time, place, and manner of speech for legitimate purposes. For example, government
can limit loud rallies to daytime
hours and require that they take
place away from hospitals, but it
cannot constitutionally allow only
the Democratic Party and not the
Republican Party to hold rallies.
1286
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The state can regulate the
content of advertising (“commercial speech”) to protect consumers from “commercial harms,”
such as false or misleading statements or claims, as long as the
regulation is viewpoint-neutral.
It can also require private entities
to inform consumers of objective, accurate facts that may not
be common knowledge, such as
the ingredients in processed food,
the true rate of interest on a
mortgage, or the actual cost of
attorneys’ legal services.3 But the
state cannot entirely prohibit advertising of a legal product such
as contraceptives or tobacco simply because it wants to discourage their sales.
Medical services are analogous to commercial practices for
purposes of the First Amendment.
The government has an interest
in regulating medical practice to
ensure safe and effective care. It
also has an interest in ensuring
that patients have enough accurate information to make voluntary, informed treatment decisions.
Hence, it is the physician’s duty
under the doctrine of informed
consent to provide material information about the benefits and
risks of both the recommended
treatment and its alternatives.
However, the First Amendment
prohibits the government from
compelling people to make false
or misleading statements or to
express the government’s point
of view as their own.
Relying on the 1992 Supreme
Court decision, North Carolina
contended that the required fetal
sonogram descriptions are merely statements of fact. The Fourth
Circuit, however, found that
North Carolina’s display provision represented “quintessential
compelled speech,” calling the
required description “ideological;
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it conveys a particular opinion.”2
The court, finding that the
“state’s avowed intent and the
anticipated effect” were to discourage abortion, said that the
provision compelled physicians
to serve as a mouthpiece for the
state’s point of view.2
North Carolina also argued
that it was not compelling speech,
but simply regulating conduct —
the practice of medicine — and
that the law could therefore be
justified under a more lenient
standard of review. It cited a decision by the Fifth Circuit finding that similar, but somewhat
less specific, information was
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to abortion decisions and
did not impose any particular
viewpoint.4
The Fourth Circuit was unpersuaded. “Though the information
conveyed may be strictly factual,”
it said, “the context surrounding
the delivery of it promotes the
viewpoint the state wishes to encourage.”2 The court emphasized
that the context in which words
are spoken can convert facts into
propaganda. In this case, a
woman in a vulnerable position
lying partially disrobed on an examination table, who relies on
her physician for objective medical information, must either listen to and watch the state’s message or cover her eyes and ears.
In such circumstances, the court
concluded, “the state has . . .
moved from ‘encouraging’ to lecturing, using health care providers as its mouthpiece.”2
Do laws like the North Carolina statute improve the informedconsent process — or distort it
by commandeering physicians to
act as agents of the state? The
answer will affect not only abortion services but all medical
practice. As the Supreme Court
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has made clear, “a requirement
that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion
is, for constitutional purposes,
no different from a requirement
that a doctor give certain specific
information about any medical
procedure.”1 If the state can require physicians to perform specific procedures and tell patients
certain things about abortion, it
can do the same for kidney transplantation, contraceptives, psychiatric treatment, and investigational therapies.
Last July, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
Florida law forbidAn audio interview
ding physicians to
with Prof. Mariner
ask patients about
is available at NEJM.org
firearms in the
home, finding that the prohibition did not violate physicians’
First Amendment rights when
the inquiry is “unnecessary to a
patient’s care.”5 The court did,
however, note a fundamental reason for the doctrine of informed
consent: “when a patient enters a
physician’s examination room, the
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patient is in a position of relative
powerlessness.”5 The Fourth Circuit recognized this vulnerability,
too, but drew a different conclusion. Instead of protecting patient autonomy, North Carolina’s
law forced the patient to take affirmative steps to protect herself
against unwelcome, distressing,
or unhelpful speech from the very
physician she relies on for personalized care. This charade demeans both the physician and
the patient.
These cases present two radically different views of informed
consent: the traditional view that
rational decision making and patient autonomy are best protected
by allowing physicians to tailor
disclosures to their patients’ needs
and preferences; and the view
that government can use informed
consent to encourage specific decisions by regulating what tests
physicians must perform, what
information they must present,
and what information they cannot seek.
Laws prescribing exactly what
physicians must say, regardless

of patients’ needs or preferences,
make a mockery of informed
consent and patient autonomy.
Laws that compel physicians to
speak for the state devalue physicians’ professional judgment and
responsibility to act in patients’
best interests. The First Amendment was adopted to keep the
government from controlling what
people, including physicians, say.
Protection of patients’ rights
should not be used as a pretext
to promote partisan political purposes in the examining room.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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Market-Based Solutions to Antitrust Threats — The Rejection
of the Partners Settlement
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H

ealth care consumers won
a significant victory when
Massachusetts Suffolk County
Superior Court Judge Janet Sanders
blocked a settlement that would
have allowed Partners HealthCare, the system that dominates
the Boston area, to acquire three
additional health care providers
in eastern Massachusetts. San
ders concluded that the acquisitions “would cement Partners’
already strong position in the

health care market and give it
the ability, because of this market muscle, to exact higher prices from insurers for the services
its providers render.”
If this decision is not overturned on appeal, consumers
will now be spared those projected price increases. But there is an
even bigger reason for New En
glanders to celebrate the judge’s
ruling. The danger lay not only
in Partners’ expanded dominance
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but also in the degree to which
the settlement would have shut
out other innovative competitors.
Sanders’s ruling closes the latest chapter in the saga of Partners HealthCare, a system formed
in 1994 as a merger between the
world-famous Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s
Hospitals. Beginning in 2010, then
Massachusetts Attorney General
Martha Coakley presciently warned
of Partners’ growing pricing
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